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Chapter 11
Retirement Security in a DC World: 
Using Behavioral Finance to Bridge 
the Expertise Gap
Jason Scott and Gregory Stein
Defined contribution DC plans can provide real retirement security, but
only if participants utilize them appropriately and make informed invest-
ment decisions. Yet, it has proved to be a challenge to provide the neces-
sary expertise to support good decisionmaking in the DC context. Many
employers have offered educational materials with fairly limited success,
partly because these educational materials have often been relatively
generic and difficult for people to apply to their own circumstances and sit-
uations. To make things a bit easier for employees, some employers have
considered purchasing advisory services for their employees. An obstacle
to this approach, from the employer’s point of view, has been legal liability:
Companies feared that if they selected advisers for their employees, then
the company might be liable for any losses employees sustained.
Three factors have contributed to a dramatic shift in employer opinion
regarding the provision of advisory services for employees. First, the US
Department of Labor (USDOL) issued an advisory opinion in May 1998
which stated that it was legal for sponsors to offer advice. The DOL then
reaffirmed that employers had the responsibility of selecting and monitor-
ing the advice provider; then, assuming prudent selection and monitoring
on the part of the employer, the advice provider was liable for the actual
advice given. A second contributing factor was a spate of Enron-like corpo-
rate scandals. These scandals, and resulting lawsuits, demonstrated
that employers bore some degree of responsibility for helping their
employees manage their pension plans. A third factor contributing to
changing attitudes was simply that more large employers began to offer
advisory services, so subsequent employers did not have to be the first to
offer advice.
The combination of these three factors has produced a dramatic change
in the willingness to offer advice, so that today, many plan sponsors now
believe that offering advisory services actually reduces their legal liability.
Nevertheless, even while employers have grown more comfortable with the
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notion of providing advice, changing employee behavior remains a difficult
task. This chapter explores some of the different techniques used to provide
advice to employees and relates the experiences of Financial Engines, Inc.,
a provider of advisory services to sponsored retirement plans, to some of the
current issues and hypotheses in behavioral finance.
In what follows, we first describe the market background associated with
advisory services to pension-covered employees. We explore the two main
employer goals for advisory services, namely disclosure and retirement
security. Next we provide some background on how the services and prod-
ucts from Financial Engines fit into this general marketplace, and we dis-
cuss reaching the employee for disclosure purposes: What approaches have
been used, their relative performance, and what explains the differences.
Corroborating a hypothesis from the behavioral finance literature, we show
how even seemingly small improvements in convenience can have a signi-
ficant impact on the ability to reach employees. Finally, we analyze
evidence on the impact of adviser and personal statements on participant
behavior. The Adviser, in particular, went through a significant redesign
that focused participants on fewer choices.
Market Background
Before diving into the specific details, it is important to understand the key
features of DC-related advisory services. When employers hire a company
to provide advisory services to their employees, they are generally looking
to accomplish one or both of the following goals:
1. Disclosure. Disclose to employees regarding their DC plan, help
employees understand how much risk they are taking, what their
retirement prospects are, and how much or how little they should
expect from their DC plan.
2. Retirement security. Help employees make better decisions regarding
investment risk and savings levels; employees should have sufficient sav-
ing and diversification to maximize their chance of a secure retirement.
The first goal arises from concerns regarding legal liability. Employers may
be concerned that their employees might make saving and investment mis-
takes, so the fundamental requirement for the first goal is communication.
The second goal involves changing individual behavior to improve retire-
ment prospects. There are both legal liability and paternalistic aspects to this
goal. If poor retirement finances might result in lawsuits, then changing
behavior to improve retirement outcomes could reduce legal liability. Of
course, some companies are primarily motivated by liability considerations,
but many others genuinely want to help employees secure their retirement
futures. For the latter employers, altering behavior is the success metric for
advisory services.
208 Jason Scott and Gregory Stein
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The Financial Engines Approach
Financial Engines, Inc. seeks to help companies with these two objectives, by
applying to the individual’s retirement problem some of the best practices
used by pension asset managers (fund style and performance attribution,
Monte Carlo simulation, mean–variance optimization, etc). In practice, this
has meant giving employees two things. First, the approach provides employ-
ees with a retirement forecast to help them set realistic expectations. Based on
their current saving and investment decisions, the forecast shows employees
how much money they can expect annually in retirement if their investments
perform well, average, or poorly. Communicating the forecast and related
information to employees delivers on the employer’s disclosure objective.
Second, the company provides specific recommendations for saving and fund
allocation to help employees improve their retirement forecasts. Persuading
individuals to act on these specific recommendations helps to accomplish the
second employer goal of improving retirement security.
“Personal Statements” and “Online Advice” are two core services that
Financial Engines currently offers.1 Personal Statements are sent to investors
via electronic or regular mail, aimed at reaching all employees. Personal
Statements first provide each participant with a personalized forecast of the
reasonable range of outcomes he can expect given his specific investments,
saving rate, and time horizon to retirement. Though analogous to a social
security projection, this forecast also includes an assessment of the range
of likely outcomes (upside, median, and downside), instead of just a point
estimate. Additionally, the statement indicates how to improve the forecast, in
ways that depend on the particular participant. For example, participants who
do not fully take advantage of an employer match receive an analysis that
shows the forecast improvement as a result of additional saving. Participants
who take an extreme risk position (either conservative or aggressive) are
shown the impact of a more diversified portfolio. As a result, the Personal
Statement provides both an educational forecast and suggestions for change.
Our second tool, the Online Adviser, allows employees to get a realistic
forecast of the range of income they can reasonably expect from their
current retirement benefits. In addition it offers specific saving and invest-
ment recommendations to help improve the retirement forecast; and
monitors progress to retirement and sends alerts if changes are necessary.
Since Personal Statements are relatively new (released broadly in the Fall of
2002), there was yet little information available for analysis. In contrast,
more information is available on the Adviser.
Reaching the Participant
It would be that assessing participants’ current situation was described as
one of the key goals in this marketplace. In the present context, the parti-
cipant must currently log on to the Financial Engines website.2 Adoption of
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the Online Adviser, therefore, occurs when the participant registers for the
Adviser service. To analyze adoption patterns, we drew a sample of com-
panies from the Financial Engines’ data warehouse. The sample was limited
to corporations with 10,000 or more participants in their 401(k) plans, to
avoid the issue of mixing data from very large and very small organizations.
It should be noted that adoption does not all occur on the first day the
Online Adviser is made available; rather the online medium is on-demand,
adoption occurs fairly uniformly over any given time period. To address
this issue, the sample was restricted to corporations that had made the
Adviser available for at least one year as of the end of 2002.3
Overall adoption results at these large firms are reported in Table 11-1.
The adoption percentage for each company is defined as the number of
participants adopting the Adviser service, divided by the total number of
plan participants (including terminated and retired participants). These
are fairly significant barriers that limit the maximum adoption that reason-
ably can be expected. Financial Engines currently has no ability to commu-
nicate effectively with participants who are terminated or who are retired
employees. In addition, Internet and plan provider access are sometimes
difficult to measure, and in some cases, these barriers can exclude half or
more of the eligible population from adopting the Adviser service. No
adjustment has been made for Internet or plan provider access.4
Adoption rates average 18 percent in the 15 companies that have offered
the service at least one year. Restricting the sample to companies that have
offered the service at least 2 years boosts the average adoption rate to
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TABLE 11-1 Current Adoption at Large Corporationsa
Average With Electronic Without Electronic Sample Size
Adoption (%) Communication (%) Communication (%) (Companies)
Years since 
rollout b
1 18.2 24.4 8.9c 15
2 28.0 33.9 10.1c 4
3 40.3 40.3 N/A3 c 2
Adoption 
measured at d
6 months 10.1 13.5 4.9 10
1 year 13.2 17.3 7.2 10
2 years 21.1 27.1 9.1 3
Notes:
a Large is defined as 10,000 or more DC plan participants.
b Sample: 15 companies, ~450,000 participants, rollout date prior to 1/1/02.
c All companies with 3 or more years of data have electronic communication.
d Sample: 10 companies, ~379,000 participants, rollout date prior to 1/1/02.
Source: Authors’ computations.
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28 percent, while companies with 3 or more years have adoption rates of
40 percent. Of course, as the sample gets smaller, there is a large potential
for company idiosyncrasies to skew the results. Corporations with three or
more years of history are on average smaller in our sample (18,000 particip-
ants versus 30,000 for the larger sample). In addition, as “early adopters,”
these firms may be different from other large corporations. Such caveats
aside, adoption does seem to significantly increase with time since the
Adviser was first made available.
One of the most effective ways of encouraging employees to utilize the
Financial Engines website is to send participants an email announcing the
availability of the service. Including a link in this email that immediately
brings the participant to the Financial Engines website makes trying the
program extremely easy. By contrast, sending the participant a hard copy
via regular mail means he must locate a computer, access the Internet, and
type in a URL to achieve the same results.
One of the findings from the behavioral finance literature is that appar-
ently small barriers can have large effects on behavior. It might be thought
that employees would be willing to spend a bit of time to arrive at a proper
plan for retirement investment, and saving decisions. But plan design can
have a potent impact. For example, a DC plan could be structured to allow
any employee who wishes to enroll in the plan (positive election enroll-
ment), or plan rules could state that every employee is automatically
enrolled unless he actively chooses to exit the plan (negative election enroll-
ment). Companies tend to go to great lengths to inform employees about
their choices and make reversing the default straightforward. Yet, this small
change in plan design has a huge impact on participation. One hypothesis is
that employees follow the “path of least resistance,” and thus any barrier can
cause employees to stick with the default choice (Choi et al., 2002).
Three alternatives have been proposed to explain this result (Duflo and
Saez, Chapter 8, this volume). First, the result could stem from employees
inferring some information from their employer’s selection of the default.
Second, employees may just not take the time to think about retirement.
Finally, the default may be a commitment device to protect individuals from
themselves. Table 11-1 provides evidence on the impact of reducing the barri-
ers to adoption. Some companies provide an email with a link to the Online
Adviser, while others do not, and the startling differences in behavior emerge.
Of the 15 large sponsors, nine allow electronic communications while six do
not. At those using electronic communications, adoption rates are almost
25 percent, while they are 9 percent if electronic communications are not
used. The sample gets extremely small when examining companies that
offered the Adviser more than 2 years, but the effect appears to be magnified.
Levels of adoption appear to be higher the longer the time since the Adviser
service has been offered. It is possible that the effect of electronic communica-
tions could be due to differences in the amount of time since the service
was first offered. For example, participants in companies with electronic
11 / Retirement Security in a DC World 211
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communications have exposed about 7 months longer than those in compa-
nies lacking electronic communication. The bottom panel of Table 11-1 looks
at interim adoption results to assess the impact of this difference.
Interim adoption results are also available for a sub sample of the main
data set. Ten of the 15 companies in the base sample had interim adoption
data available, corresponding to certain points in time (e.g. 6 months after
rollout, one year after rollout, and 2 years after rollout), as opposed to cur-
rent adoption rates. For the ten companies with available data, the average
adoption rate at the 6-month point was about ten percent, which rose to
13 percent at the 1-year mark. The impact of electronic communication
does not change after controlling for time since rollout. Firms having
electronic communication averaged 13 and 17 percent adoption at the 
6-month and 1-year mark, respectively. In contrast, companies without elec-
tronic communication averaged only 5 and 7 percent adoption at the 6-
month and 1-year mark, respectively.
Clearly, electronic communication can have a significant impact on
adoption rates.5 Since barriers are relatively low for an employer-provided
website for financial advice, the results seem to corroborate the “path of
least resistance” hypothesis. They also support the hypothesis that employ-
ees simply do not take much time to think about retirement. It is hard to
believe that the signaling mechanism is somehow dramatically stronger for
an employer that offers online advice and allows electronic communica-
tion as compared to one that simply offers online advice.
Data from Financial Engines participant satisfaction surveys also corrobo-
rate the lack of time hypothesis. While these surveys dealt with many
issues, they are very interesting for examining the question of non-adoption.
Table 11-2 reports results on non-adopters in three recent surveys. The
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TABLE 11-2 Non-Adopter Survey Results
Reasons why have not tried FE Survey Date
June 2001 March 2002 June 2002
Didn’t know it was available 
as an employee benefit (%) 25.1 48.6 37.8
Haven’t had time to try it (%) 53.3 33.3 43.3
Don’t think I need help with my 
investments (%) 3.8 3.5 3.7
Don’t want to use an Internet-based
service (%) 4.8 2.4 3.9
Other (%) 13.2 12.3 11.4
Non-adopter (number) 827 869 1,787
Source : Authors’ computations.
Utkas-11.qxd  27/5/04  3:04 PM  Page 212
results are remarkably consistent across waves: between one quarter and one
half of the non-adopters surveyed indicated they did not know the benefit
existed. An additional one-third to one half indicated they just had not
found the time to try the Adviser. Averaging across all surveys, lack of time is
reported as the single largest barrier. Interestingly, fewer than 5 percent
listed the reason as not needing financial advice, and a small similar number
indicated they were unwilling to use the Internet.
If convenience can have such a large impact, it implies that many parti-
cipants are simply unwilling to spend time planning for retirement. These
results are broadly consistent with MacFarland, Marconi, and Utkus
(Chapter 6, this volume), who find that many people are “disinclined to
be interested in the key activities or attitudes needed to make informed
choices.” Their analysis suggests that one-third or more of the working
population may be avoiding thinking about retirement issues.
The survey results, and the prominence of small barriers, imply that
providers must either improve convenience or eliminate the need for par-
ticipants to proactively go online. Two approaches have been explored to
incorporate these insights, one involving improving communication and
convenience through enhanced provider integration, and a second which
removes the online barrier altogether, by repackaging information avail-
able in the Adviser service in an offline format like a Personal Statement.
Our data are still preliminary, but indications are that both approaches can
enhance the reach of advisory services.
Provider Integration
Though electronic communication does seem to enhance adoption, send-
ing information via email has two significant shortcomings. First, some
employers will not or cannot communicate with their employees via email.
Second, participants who receive an email communication may not be
interested in delving into their retirement planning when they get the
email at work. For these reasons, provider integration is one form of elec-
tronic communication that overcomes both of these shortcomings.
Provider integration can mean a variety of things. When participants use
a 401(k) provider website, they usually check their account balances,
update their contribution rates, or adjust their investment mixes. In its sim-
plest form, provider integration means alerting a participant to the avail-
ability of financial assistance at a relevant juncture so participants who are
updating their investment mix could be asked if they would like to view the
recommendations from the advice provider. Or participants who are updat-
ing their saving rates could be presented with an analysis that illustrates the
impact of increasing saving on retirement wealth. The appeal of provider
integration is that it overcomes the two main weaknesses of email commu-
nication. Even if a company does not actively communicate with employees
11 / Retirement Security in a DC World 213
Utkas-11.qxd  27/5/04  3:04 PM  Page 213
electronically, many of these employees will still visit provider sites to main-
tain their accounts. Also, offering an analysis when the participant requests
a change ensures that the participant has at least overcome the mental
barrier of finding time to update his 401(k).
We have recently launched a pilot version of a provider integration
approach which links to the Adviser, conducted at a Fortune 500 company.
The pilot was started when roughly 9 percent of participants had adopted
the Adviser service, several months after making the Adviser available.
Projections suggested that the likely adoption rate after another year would
have been 14 percent, assuming no other communication programs. Just
3 months into the pilot, adoption had risen from 9 to 13 percent, a 
44 percent increase, and adoption expected to exceed 20 percent, a year
into the pilot. It should be possible to enhance rates further, since particip-
ants currently must accept an Investor Services Agreement during the
transfer from the plan provider to Financial Engines, yet some participants
fail to do so. A small adjustment to this practice could have a significant
impact on the number of participants that receive advice. Importantly, the
potential improvement would be greatest for sponsors without electronic
communication, since “path resistance” is dramatically reduced for their
employees. Further, since provider integration levels the playing field
between sponsors that do and do not allow electronic communications, it
provides an opportunity to test the hypothesis that electronic communica-
tion results stem from sponsor selection bias rather than a differential
effect from the communication method.
Personal Statements
Another approach to improving reach is Personal Statements, which elimi-
nate the online barrier by offering much of the information in a paper
format. The benefit of this approach is that participants need not actively
request an online financial analysis; instead, participants are mailed, or
emailed, a Personal Statement for their own 401(k) plan. The statement
provides each participant with a retirement forecast, and also illustrates
how the participant could improve his retirement situation through saving
more, diversifying, etc. since Personal Statements are relatively new, first
released in 2002, little data are available to date. Table 11-3 reports some
initial survey information collected by a company currently using Personal
Statements, which indicates that about two-thirds of the participants can
recall receiving a Personal Statement. This represents a substantial increase
in reach, relative to the Online Adviser.
Changing Participant Behavior
Reaching the participant satisfies the employer’s disclosure requirement, and
it also provides useful information to help him make informed decisions. In
214 Jason Scott and Gregory Stein
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addition, some firms seek to change participant behavior to improve actual
retirement security.
Behavioral finance, as a field, is concerned with understanding the behav-
ior and biases of individuals as they relate to financial decisions. In the pre-
sent context several studies are relevant. For instance, Iyengar and Lepper
(2002) examine the relationship between the number of choices offered to
consumers and their resulting decisions. They found that extensive choice
attracted more attention, but that limited choice motivated actual purchases
in a food context. Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang (Chapter 5, this volume)
relate the impact of choice to 401(k) participation. They show that the num-
ber of fund choices negatively influences the participation rates after con-
trolling for a number of other factors. This is probably because a large and
confusing number of choices may create a barrier sufficient to discourage
participants from enrolling in the 401(k).
The Adviser Redesign
To test these ideas, Financial Engines redesigned the Online Adviser in late
2002. The major change was how choices were communicated to particip-
ants. Prior to the redesign, the participant was given a range of choices for
each of the major retirement decisions: Saving, investment risk level, and
allocation to company stock. For example, suppose a participant was cur-
rently contributing $2,000 a year to his 401(k) plan. Prior to the redesign,
the participant would have been encouraged to choose from five potential
saving levels: ($0, $2,000, $3,000, $5,000, and $10,000). The impact of the
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TABLE 11-3 Personal Statement Survey Resultsa
Responses (%)
Recently, you were sent a Personal Retirement Forecastb from your employer. 




Since reviewing your forecast,b have you made any changes to your 401(k)
account (such as increasing your savings or changing your 
investments)?
Yes, I have already made some changes. 16
No, but I plan on making some changes. 52
No, I do not plan on making any changes. 32
Notes:
a 3,138 surveys were mailed, and 142 were completed and returned.
b “Forecast” in this context refers to the Personal Statement.
Source: Financial Engines.
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retirement forecast was described for each level of saving. A participant
also could input his own level of saving if his was not one of the five
choices given.6
The redesign completely changed this framework. Instead of offering
a range of choices, the participant is now provided with a single alternative
to consider. Continuing with the saving example, suppose the employer
matches employee contributions up to $3,500 for this participant. In that
case, the initial saving choices would be limited to staying at the worker’s
current level of saving ($2,000) or switching to a level of savings that fully
utilized the employer match ($3,500). A wider range of choices was still
available, but the participant had to actively request the range. For each of
the major retirement decisions, the redesign presented a single focal alter-
native and concentrated the participant’s attention on the binary decision
of staying where he was switching to a single alternative.
Another part of the redesign involves the Advice Action Kit (AAK),
a screen in the Adviser service that summarizes changes between the
participant’s current situation and the new strategy he or she has selected.
The AAK is a strong measure of impact, because it is only requested to
facilitate implementation. It is not interactive, and it is rendered as a
printable list of instructions necessary to implement the plan. For this
reason, AAK data is believed to represent a serious retirement plan on the
participant’s part.
Our analysis of over 34,000 AAKs roughly split between pre- and post-
redesign, appears in Table 11-4. The top row 4 reports results for the saving
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TABLE 11.4 AAK Analysis
Action Percentage of Sample Percentage of Sample Sample Size
(Prior to Redesign) (Post-Redesign)
Save morea 31b 45c 24,040
Adjusted riskd 35 51 33,427
Reduced stock, 14f 30g 34,589
full samplee
Reduced stock, 28f 60g 17,412
initial stock level  0%
Notes:
a Approximately 6% of the sample decided to save less in both cases.
b Median saving increased from $3,240 to $5,468 per annum.
c Median saving increased from $2,700 to $5,551 per annum.
d “Adjusted Risk” implies a change in portfolio volatility in excess of 5% of market volatility.
(~55 bps as of April 2003).
e Less than three percent of the sample actually increased company stock in both cases.
f Median ending stock allocation is 37%. Median stock reduction was 69%.
g Median ending stock allocation is 28%. Median stock reduction was 82%.
Source: Authors’ computations.
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decision.7 Prior to the redesign, 31 percent of the sample decided to save
more, and after the redesign, 45 percent were saving more. In addition,
while ending saving levels were comparable, the increase in savings was
about $500 more in the post-redesign sample. The redesign also influ-
enced the number of participants willing to change their investment risk
level. Prior to the redesign, about one in three participants created an
action plan with a materially different risk level from their original port-
folio. After the redesign, this proportion increased to one in two.
The largest change perceived related to the company stock decision.
Prior to the redesign, 14 percent of AAKs identified a desire to reduce
company stock; after the redesign, this proportion increased to 30 percent.
The magnitude of proposed changes also increased after the redesign.
Before, the median ending level of company stock was 37 percent and after
the redesign, the median ending stock allocation was 28 percent. The com-
pany stock results are somewhat understated, in that only half the available
sample actually started with a positive amount of company stock. Limiting
the sample to these participants, the fraction that reduced company stock
pre- and post-redesign was 28 and 60 percent, respectively. This evidence
corroborates the hypotheses that fewer and more direct choices are much
more likely to generate action, compared to “choice overload.”8
The pilot also allowed us to explore the effectiveness of this approach on
changing participant behavior via provider integration. Preliminary data
indicate that it is very important to be able to process fund transfers and
savings adjustments directly from the Financial Engines website, without
having to print the instructions and then go to the provider website to
effect the change. In 3 months of data available from the pilot, the transac-
tion incidence is five times higher for participants using the integrated
approach as compared to those using other sources.
Limited survey data are also available to address the reach of Personal
Statements, shown in the lower panel of Table 11-3. The results prove inter-
esting. Of those surveyed, 16 percent had already made a change, and
another 52 percent intending to make a change to either their saving level
or investment mix. Of course, there is a gap between intending to make a
change and actually making a change, when self-control and procrastina-
tion problems play a significant role (Benartzi and Thaler, 2004).
Conclusions
Our research shows that communication methods can alter fundamental
life decisions such as saving and investment levels. We corroborate this by
examining the likelihood that employees utilize an employer-provided
online advisory benefit. We find that employees who receive an email
regarding the availability of the advisory service are much more likely to
use it, than to those who receive a hard copy version in the mail. Also we
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find that the reason participants do not avail themselves of the service is
primarily due to lack of time, since they readily admit the need for help. We
further explored the impact of a redesign of the online advisory service.
Reducing the number of choices employees were given from five to two
increased by 40–100 percent the frequency with which individuals altered
their behavior. Last, we evaluated data from a pilot version of provider inte-
gration, which reduces the barriers to action by offering services when indi-
viduals are most likely to be receptive. We find that lower barriers are
associated with roughly double the adoption rate, and roughly five times
the action rate.
Clearly, there is still work to do to help ensure retirement security in DC
plans. Nevertheless, we conclude that insights from behavioral finance
can have a large real-world impact on the decisions people make, and ulti-
mately on their retirement well-being.
Notes
1 Discretionary asset management may also be useful for addressing the needs of
many investors with little time for or interest in investing, but our focus is not that
market.
2 Integrating the forecast on the provider website could overcome this constraint.
3 One company was excluded from the analysis because participants were required
to enter credit card information prior to adoption. These “participant pay”
arrangements are no longer offered because the barriers were too large for particip-
ants to reasonably overcome.
4 In some situations, participants first have to create an account with their plan
provider before using the Adviser.
5 We acknowledge that, the fact that a sponsor allows electronic communication
could proxy for other factors influencing adoption. For example, those sponsors
may be more likely to have an Internet-enabled workforce, or they may have a
higher percentage of white-collar workers.
6 The saving level choices were selected to be “focal” in some way. Typical choices
included the participants’ current saving level, a level that exhausted the employer
match, and the maximum saving level allowed.
7 All AAK data is not available since easily accessible AAK logs have only recently
been created. In addition, not all AAK logs have complete saving information.
8 Fund transactions and savings adjustments are enabled directly from the
Financial Engines website (without having to go to the provider site) for a few
providers. The “transaction enabled” AAK data corresponds to approximately a 5%
subsample. Results from this subsample did not materially differ from results in
Table 11-4.
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